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UNDERSTANDING THE YEMENI CRISIS:   
THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRIBAL ROLES IN RECENT DECADES 
 
Helen Lackner 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tribes are a fundamental element of Yemen’s social fabric and therefore important in understanding 
the various levels of conflict in the country.  They are vastly misunderstood, the term ‘tribe’ is often 
used in an anti-historical way, ignoring the changes which have taken place over the decades, within 
tribes and in their relations with others.  Not only misunderstood, but also subject to multiple 
prejudices which caricature and generalise on the basis of selected characteristics about individual 
tribes.  Disparaging1 and indeed, insulting statements about tribes can be found with great ease in the 
media, even in academia and among educated people.  Most of us involved in the region will certainly 
have experienced them on an almost daily basis.  In particular urban people tend to despise tribesmen 
and use the word bedu to disparage both tribespeople and nomads.  Among others, Corstange presents 
an excellent summary of these prejudices: “in the Yemeni context… the tribesmen are often stylized 
as uneducated, backward, ignorant, uncultured, tradition-bound, irrational, uncivilized and violent.  
These views are often strongest among city- dwellers, the educated elite, and those who strongly 
oppose the current governing regime in Yemen, which is associated with tribalism and tribal 
traditions.  Unflattering jokes abound about the ignorance and stupidity of tribesmen, and the epithet 
‘tribal’ is not infrequently used as a synonym for ‘backward’.2 
 
Other than demystification, there are many reasons why tribes and their changed nature and 
relationship to other social groups in Yemen are very relevant to the country’s present and future. 
Here are just two examples: 
 
- One outcome of the transition process which started in 2011 is that the country should 
become a federal state of six regions: should tribal allegiances be a relevant consideration in 
the definition of these regions’ borders?  Can they be?  Is the tribal factor more or less 
relevant to this issue than water basins?3 
- Among those prosecuting the current war, it was assumed that the allegiance of tribesmen 
could be ensured by the provision of incentives (as had been done during the civil war in the 
Yemen Arab Republic in the 1960s), but this has clearly not been the case.  The military 
balance in the war over the past year has certainly been influenced by the allegiances of tribes 
on different fronts, but incentives have been unable to tip it.  Had things been different, the 
coalition forces would have reached San‘a months ago. 
  
This paper addresses a set of related aspects of this problematic. 
 
- First I briefly examine some of the debate around the nature of tribes and the wide range of 
phenomena described as tribal.  This will clarify some of the misconceptions and 
misunderstandings about Yemen in general and its tribes in particular. 
- This is followed by a description of Yemen’s social structure at the time of the revolutions of 
the 1960s.  This period is indicative of the situation for the preceding century or so.  While I 
                                                     
1  Tutwiler, R. (1987). Tribe, tribute and trade: social class formation in highland Yemen. PhD. State University 
of New York at Binghamton, p.149. 
2  Corstange, D. (2008). Tribes and the rule of law in Yemen.  Paper presented to the Annual Conference of 
Middle East Studies Association (MESA), p.9. 
3  For an analysis of the transition see: Lackner, H. (2016). Yemen’s ‘peaceful’ transition from autocracy: could 
it have succeeded? Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Dhamar Governorate: preparing fields for rain-fed crops, April 2007. (Copyright Helen Lackner).
Ibb Governorate al Rudhma district, profits from qat, 2010. (Copyright Helen Lackner).
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do not suggest for a moment that Yemeni society prior to this time was static or enjoying the 
‘eternal present’ encountered in much traditional anthropological literature, this period 
roughly represents a state of affairs prior to the significant social, political and economic 
transformations which later fundamentally redesigned its social structure. 
- The third part addresses changes in social structures since the 1970s, and the way in which 
these structures have fully developed since unification in 1990 as a result of modifications in 
the nature of the country’s economic base.  I will discuss the tensions which have arisen as a 
result, particularly through the emergence of a single elite combining military, economic and 
political power, and its impact on tribal relations and the nature of the tribe as a concept. 
- Finally, I will assess the relevance of these changes in social formations on two of today’s 
urgent issues, the role of political parties and the importance of jihadism.  I conclude with 
some remarks on the extent to which the emerging social forces could contribute to a solution 
of the country’s current deep crisis. 
 
WHAT IS A TRIBE?  CAN IT BE PART OF A MODERN STATE? 
 
Both in ordinary life and among academics, tribes in the Middle East are usually assumed to have the 
following characteristics: they are rural, membership is based on kinship relations and on sets of 
segmentary lineages4, mutual solidarity is the basis for relationships within the tribe or sub-tribe, their 
political economy is based on nomadic pastoralism (sometimes complemented by oasis agriculture) in 
which raiding settled communities and each other is a basic source of income.  Many authors5, and not 
only those from the Marxist tradition, see tribes as pre-state forms of political organization, while 
others see them as alternatives and challengers to the state.  While supposedly egalitarian internally, 
most writers order them hierarchically on the basis of their economy, ranking camel herders first, 
followed by sheep and goat herders, and then settled agricultural tribes.6  For each of these 
characteristics, exceptions can be found, as we will see shortly.  
 
Surprisingly, the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences does not even mention the Middle 
East or pastoral nomads in its discussion of tribes7, and readers are left wondering whether this is a 
reflection of lack of knowledge.  The following fairly comprehensive definition of tribes, focused on 
the Middle East, will serve as a reliable reference point: 
  
Tribe may be used loosely of a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of 
organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of 
customs, dialect or language, and origins);  tribes are usually politically unified, though not 
necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction 
with states.  Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political structures of 
                                                     
4  As neatly explained by Swagman ‘tribal structure is segmentary, that is, tribes are composed of sections, 
subsections, sub-subsections and so on; the actual number of levels can vary.... a subsection might include ten or 
twenty villages spread out over a twenty or twenty-five square kilometre area… a qabila is made up of a number 
of sections, covering hundreds of square kilometers and may number thirty or forty thousand members’ 
(Swagman, C. (1988). Tribe and politics: an example from highland Yemen. Journal of Anthropological 
Research, 44(3), p.252.)  While segmentarism is out of fashion in recent writings, it may still be of some 
relevance. 
5  Carapico, S. (1984). The political economy of self-help development cooperatives in the Yemen Arab 
Republic. PhD. University of New York at Binghamton, p.79; Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J. (1990). Tribes and 
state formation in the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
6  Among others, see: Jabar, F. (2003). Sheikhs and ideologues: deconstruction and reconstruction of tribes 
under patrimonial totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998. In: F. Jabar and H. Dawod, eds, Tribes and power: 
nationalism and ethnicity in the Middle East, 1st ed. London: Saqi. 
7  Darity Jr, W. ed. (2008). International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 8, 2nd ed. Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, pp.449-451. 
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tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these 
intermediate structures.8 
 
Tribes and the state 
 
The academic9 and political debate about the role of tribes and their relationship to the state ranges 
widely between two extremes: some see tribes as entities which, by definition, oppose and compete 
with the state, while others see tribalism as a mechanism for supporting or complementing the state, 
as an intermediary institution between the state and village-level communities.  Confirming yet again 
the importance of Ibn Khaldun, most contemporary discussions on the subject return to his analysis, 
either to support or challenge it.  While there have often been tensions between centralised state 
authorities and the tribes within their territories, in practice, in the past century the hierarchy seems 
clear, and tribes operate within the various states around them.10  Recently, social anthropologists 
have adopted very similar interpretations, most prominent among them is Godelier.11 
 
Corstange, on the basis of fieldwork in Yemen in the first decade of the 21st century, has a more 
restrictive interpretation, believing that ‘tribes, whatever else they may do and however else they may 
be valued by the members, act as second-best substitutes for an absent or weak state.  They supply a 
modicum of security and the rule of law via the semi-private provision of tribal law, which serves as 
an imperfect substitute for state law’.12 
 
In Yemen in recent decades, before discussing ex-president Saleh’s relationship with tribes, it is worth 
noting that, by his actions rather than his rhetoric, he demonstrated understanding of his role in clearly 
authoritarian terms ‘where the military ghalaba (domination) has … made possible a generally 
unrestrained plunder of the society’s available resources’.13  Although he asserted that Yemen is a 
‘tribal state’ his interpretation of the role of tribes was far from its ideal model.  He did indeed use 
standard tribal (and indeed European) dynastic models to strengthen his position by marrying into as 
many tribal and other groups as possible, in order to expand his loyalty base.14  His respect for most 
tribal norms, such as honour and consultation, was rather less notable.  
 
There has been widespread cynicism about what has become known as jumlukiyas15 in the Arab 
world, i.e. the process whereby almost all the leaders of so-called republican states (most of whom 
came to power through military coups and then got themselves elected, and re-elected again and 
again) have tried to pass on their positions to their sons.  In Saleh’s case, given his view that Yemen is 
a tribal state, he would probably argue that he was following tribal tradition when trying to pass on the 
presidency to this son.  Saleh’s own tribe, Sanhan, is a minor branch of the Hashed tribal 
confederation, one of the two leading tribal groups in northern Yemen.  His struggle against the al 
Ahmar family, the recognised leaders of that confederation, can also be interpreted as an attempted 
                                                     
8  R. Tapper, quoted in: Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J. (1990). Tribes and state formation in the Middle East, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, p.5. 
9  See the many important contributions in: Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J., eds. (1990). Tribes and state formation 
in the Middle East. Los Angeles and London: University of California Press; Luciani, G. (1990). The Arab state. 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press; Jabar, F. and Dawod, H. (2003). Tribes and power: 
nationalism and ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Saqi; Dawod, H., ed. (2004). Tribus et pouvoirs en terre 
d’Islam. Paris: Armand Colin; Weir, S. (2007). A tribal order: politics and law in the mountains of Yemen. 
London: British Museum Press.  
10  Interpretation confirmed by Weir, S. (2007), op. cit.  p.105. 
11  Godelier, M. (2004). A propos des concepts de tribu, ethnie et état, formes et fonctions du pouvoir politique. 
In: H. Dawod, ed., Tribus et pouvoirs en terre d’Islam, 1st ed. Paris: Armand Colin, p.296. 
12  Corstange, D. (2008). Op.cit.  p.2. 
13  Salamé, G. (1990). ‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ states: a qualified return to the Muqaddimah. In: G. Luciani, ed., The 
Arab state, 1st ed. London: Routledge, p.31. 
14  Another example of this mechanism was Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, see: Kostiner, J. (1990). Transforming 
dualities: tribe and state formation in Saudi Arabia. In: P. Khoury and J. Kostiner, eds. (1990), op. cit. p.230. 
15  A combination of the terms jumhuriya (republic) and mamlakiya (monarchy). 
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political economy is based on nomadic pastoralism (sometimes complemented by oasis agriculture) in 
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4  As neatly explained by Swagman ‘tribal structure is segmentary, that is, tribes are composed of sections, 
subsections, sub-subsections and so on; the actual number of levels can vary.... a subsection might include ten or 
twenty villages spread out over a twenty or twenty-five square kilometre area… a qabila is made up of a number 
of sections, covering hundreds of square kilometers and may number thirty or forty thousand members’ 
(Swagman, C. (1988). Tribe and politics: an example from highland Yemen. Journal of Anthropological 
Research, 44(3), p.252.)  While segmentarism is out of fashion in recent writings, it may still be of some 
relevance. 
5  Carapico, S. (1984). The political economy of self-help development cooperatives in the Yemen Arab 
Republic. PhD. University of New York at Binghamton, p.79; Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J. (1990). Tribes and 
state formation in the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
6  Among others, see: Jabar, F. (2003). Sheikhs and ideologues: deconstruction and reconstruction of tribes 
under patrimonial totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998. In: F. Jabar and H. Dawod, eds, Tribes and power: 
nationalism and ethnicity in the Middle East, 1st ed. London: Saqi. 
7  Darity Jr, W. ed. (2008). International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 8, 2nd ed. Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, pp.449-451. 
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tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these 
intermediate structures.8 
 
Tribes and the state 
 
The academic9 and political debate about the role of tribes and their relationship to the state ranges 
widely between two extremes: some see tribes as entities which, by definition, oppose and compete 
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authorities and the tribes within their territories, in practice, in the past century the hierarchy seems 
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modicum of security and the rule of law via the semi-private provision of tribal law, which serves as 
an imperfect substitute for state law’.12 
 
In Yemen in recent decades, before discussing ex-president Saleh’s relationship with tribes, it is worth 
noting that, by his actions rather than his rhetoric, he demonstrated understanding of his role in clearly 
authoritarian terms ‘where the military ghalaba (domination) has … made possible a generally 
unrestrained plunder of the society’s available resources’.13  Although he asserted that Yemen is a 
‘tribal state’ his interpretation of the role of tribes was far from its ideal model.  He did indeed use 
standard tribal (and indeed European) dynastic models to strengthen his position by marrying into as 
many tribal and other groups as possible, in order to expand his loyalty base.14  His respect for most 
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There has been widespread cynicism about what has become known as jumlukiyas15 in the Arab 
world, i.e. the process whereby almost all the leaders of so-called republican states (most of whom 
came to power through military coups and then got themselves elected, and re-elected again and 
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8  R. Tapper, quoted in: Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J. (1990). Tribes and state formation in the Middle East, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, p.5. 
9  See the many important contributions in: Khoury, P. and Kostiner, J., eds. (1990). Tribes and state formation 
in the Middle East. Los Angeles and London: University of California Press; Luciani, G. (1990). The Arab state. 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press; Jabar, F. and Dawod, H. (2003). Tribes and power: 
nationalism and ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Saqi; Dawod, H., ed. (2004). Tribus et pouvoirs en terre 
d’Islam. Paris: Armand Colin; Weir, S. (2007). A tribal order: politics and law in the mountains of Yemen. 
London: British Museum Press.  
10  Interpretation confirmed by Weir, S. (2007), op. cit.  p.105. 
11  Godelier, M. (2004). A propos des concepts de tribu, ethnie et état, formes et fonctions du pouvoir politique. 
In: H. Dawod, ed., Tribus et pouvoirs en terre d’Islam, 1st ed. Paris: Armand Colin, p.296. 
12  Corstange, D. (2008). Op.cit.  p.2. 
13  Salamé, G. (1990). ‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ states: a qualified return to the Muqaddimah. In: G. Luciani, ed., The 
Arab state, 1st ed. London: Routledge, p.31. 
14  Another example of this mechanism was Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, see: Kostiner, J. (1990). Transforming 
dualities: tribe and state formation in Saudi Arabia. In: P. Khoury and J. Kostiner, eds. (1990), op. cit. p.230. 
15  A combination of the terms jumhuriya (republic) and mamlakiya (monarchy). 
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take-over of its leadership.  His whole strategy in building an authoritarian state has been based on 
manipulating and distorting tribal procedures to strengthen his position at everyone’s expense. 
 
I will not further address this debate here, but rather simply say that in practice in Yemen in the past 
centuries, to retain and consolidate their power leaders at the central state level have found it 
opportune to co-operate and co-opt the tribes living within their territories, given the need for tribal 
military strength in order to face both external and internal potential threats.  Tribes and tribal 
confederations are constituent elements of broader entities, with a distribution of responsibilities 
between the tribe and the state, each having a complementary role, working best in alliance through 
negotiations. 
 
YEMENI SOCIAL STRUCTURE BEFORE THE UPHEAVALS OF THE REVOLUTIONS 
 
Yemeni society is frequently described as tribal, leading to the widespread belief that all Yemenis are 
members of tribes.  It is therefore useful to examine briefly the overall social structure of the country 
and some of the significant differences found across it.  As no statistics are available on the subject, 
analysts are left with estimates.  It is widely accepted that at least 70%, possibly up to 80%, of the 
country’s population are members of tribes.  So what are the other social groups?  And what is or was 
their relationship to the tribes? 
 
Yemeni social structure bears similarities with those found in other so-called tribal societies, and also 
has specificities which ensure its uniqueness.  One feature of Yemeni tribes which conforms to the 
standard definitions is that they are rural.  However, the ascribed or inherited nature of the occupation 
based categories has led to academic debate comparing Yemeni social structure with the south Asian 
caste system.  The list below summarises hierarchically the overall situation, though there are some 
regional variations, particularly concerning exactly which occupation goes into which lower group. 
 
- The top ranking social group is that of the sada (sg sayyed), sometimes and in some places 
known as Hashemites or ashraf.  They claim descent from the Prophet and their roles are 
primarily religious and judicial.  Until the 1962 Revolution, the northern part of the country 
was ruled by Zaydi sada Imams, and the main ideological characteristic of the Huthi 
movement today is its belief that sada have an innate right to rule.  Sada also play a major 
political role in Hadramaut.  Throughout the country, in addition to their religious and judicial 
roles sada are also landowners.  Interestingly sada often live in villages where they form the 
totality or the majority of the population, rather than being dispersed in tribal villages. 
- Just below sada in status are the quda (sg qadi), a group of people whose status has originated 
from their learning and who in the past acted as judges and bureaucrats.  They have tribal 
origins and only became a distinct social group over centuries of practice. 
- The next group, forming the vast majority of the population, are the tribespeople who are thus 
the mainstream of Yemeni society.  In Yemen the overwhelming majority of tribespeople in 
the pre-revolutionary period were settled agriculturalists, primarily owner-cultivators, though 
there were already some who worked as sharecroppers.  To deal with another myth, according 
to which the southern highlands are not tribal, tribes are found throughout the country.  The 
difference resides in the level of political consolidation of tribal units, which ranges from 
small tribes of a few hundred people covering a village or a district and who are loosely 
associated with each other through common ancestry, to the well-known major 
confederations, in the northern highlands of the Hashed and Bakil and in the southern area of 
the Awlaqi.  Tribes are the main arms-bearing group and were dominant in society as they 
were the formal and effective protectors of the rest of the population, both those ranking 
above below them. 
- Below them were the groups considered weak16 (da’if) headed by traders and followed by 
                                                     
16  Distribution of activities and status hierarchies vary considerably for this group.  For a useful table with the 
ranking given by different authors, see: Stevenson, T. (1985). Social change in a Yemeni highlands town. Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, p.94. 
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- bani khums which included artisans of all kinds as well as the less despised among the service 
providers such as ‘restaurant operators’, heralds, barbers and blood letters and ‘henna 
decorators’ among women. 
- Although the last mentioned were providing ‘bodily’ services, they were less despised than 
the akhdam considered the lowest social group whose status was worsened by a range of 
prejudices which still prevail today17 and who were below the ‘abid’, i.e. slaves.  Up to now, 
their main occupations are cleaning and begging, though they also occasionally work as 
casual cash labourers. 
 
While slaves18 (abid) had been servants of wealthier households, pre-republic they had also formed 
the army and the administrative and bureaucratic class of local rulers, whether in Hadramaut, San‘a, 
or the Tihama.  This had two major implications, which enhanced their status post slavery: first they 
were in a position to give orders and demand obedience from all groups above them in the hierarchy 
thanks to their role as enforcers of state rulers’ orders, and second, they could bear arms as soldiers, 
something which, otherwise, only tribesmen were allowed to do. 
 
Slavery and formal ascribed statuses were legally abolished by the republics and, according to the 
constitution, all Yemeni citizens are equal.  But in reality, these inherited status groups remain 
important and are part of daily reality.  Most people know and mention that those around them belong 
to one or another of these groups and behaviour towards them varies accordingly.  Although in recent 
decades ascribed status categories have both weakened and changed, they remain important.  The 
main indicator of their persistence concerns intermarriage which is, indeed, the standard social 
anthropological method for assessing the strength of ascribed status. 
 
In a fairly straightforward manner, social structure reflected the economic one.  Except in the most 
arid areas with very small populations where nomadic herding prevailed and the coastal areas where 
fishing was the main activity, the Yemeni economy was based on cultivation everywhere.  
Tribespeople and sada owned land, and tribesmen and women cultivated their own land with 
assistance from their household members; at times of peak activity, family labour was complemented 
by exchange of labour and occasionally by hired workers.19  Holdings were small, but sufficient to 
provide a limited surplus used to pay for services from the non-cultivating groups, whether of higher 
or lower status.  The few large landowners were mainly ‘state’ rulers.  Tribesmen’s governance role 
was to provide protection to the other groups.  There were tribal sharecroppers though their numbers 
were limited and usually due to family impoverishment resulting from some misfortune or other.  This 
is the main rational explanation for the idea of ‘egalitarianism’ within the tribes which is one of the 
prevailing beliefs about tribes and which, in my view, deserves more examination and discussion, 
given clear differences of wealth and sources of income. The few large landowners were mainly 
rulers. 
 
Sada did in some areas in the northern highlands cultivate their own land, but this was rare.  In most 
cases they had sharecroppers, either tribesmen or others.  In the case of Hadramaut and some of the 
lowlands,  where there were fewer agricultural tribesmen, cultivation became a low status occupation 
and specific groups sharecropped the land for the sada; there the term fellah (pl. fellaheen), which 
elsewhere means farmer, came to mean a specific low status cultivating group who under no 
circumstances were allowed to own land.20  Hadrami tribes were more involved in nomadic and semi-
                                                     
17  Dolores Walters devoted her PhD thesis to analysing the comparative levels of low-status groups and 
attempting to identify the origins of these phenomena.  See: Walters, D. (1987). Perceptions of Social Inequality 
in the Yemen Arab Republic. PhD. New York University. 
18  For a brief discussion of the status roles of slaves and akhdam, see: Meissner, J. (1987). Tribes at the core: 
legitimacy, structure and power in Zaydi Yemen. PhD, Columbia University, pp.165-170. 
19  See: Weir, S. (2007), op.cit. pp.33-35. 
20  See: Lackner. H., (forthcoming, 2017). Rural life and land tenure in Wadi Hadhramaut: links with 
outmigration. In: N. Brehony, ed., Migration from Yemen: the politics and identity of the Hadhrami diaspora. 
London: I.B. Tauris; Dostal, W. (1984). Squire and peasant in Tarim: a study of “rent capitalism” in southern 
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take-over of its leadership.  His whole strategy in building an authoritarian state has been based on 
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something which, otherwise, only tribesmen were allowed to do. 
 
Slavery and formal ascribed statuses were legally abolished by the republics and, according to the 
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important and are part of daily reality.  Most people know and mention that those around them belong 
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decades ascribed status categories have both weakened and changed, they remain important.  The 
main indicator of their persistence concerns intermarriage which is, indeed, the standard social 
anthropological method for assessing the strength of ascribed status. 
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is the main rational explanation for the idea of ‘egalitarianism’ within the tribes which is one of the 
prevailing beliefs about tribes and which, in my view, deserves more examination and discussion, 
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lowlands,  where there were fewer agricultural tribesmen, cultivation became a low status occupation 
and specific groups sharecropped the land for the sada; there the term fellah (pl. fellaheen), which 
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17  Dolores Walters devoted her PhD thesis to analysing the comparative levels of low-status groups and 
attempting to identify the origins of these phenomena.  See: Walters, D. (1987). Perceptions of Social Inequality 
in the Yemen Arab Republic. PhD. New York University. 
18  For a brief discussion of the status roles of slaves and akhdam, see: Meissner, J. (1987). Tribes at the core: 
legitimacy, structure and power in Zaydi Yemen. PhD, Columbia University, pp.165-170. 
19  See: Weir, S. (2007), op.cit. pp.33-35. 
20  See: Lackner. H., (forthcoming, 2017). Rural life and land tenure in Wadi Hadhramaut: links with 
outmigration. In: N. Brehony, ed., Migration from Yemen: the politics and identity of the Hadhrami diaspora. 
London: I.B. Tauris; Dostal, W. (1984). Squire and peasant in Tarim: a study of “rent capitalism” in southern 
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nomadic pastoralism, complementing the limited resource of the remote pasturelands by grazing their 
animals on crop residues after the harvest (and thus fertilising the soil).  
 
So agricultural production was the mainstay of economic life for the majority of the population, and 
the higher status groups had access to the services of artisans producing agricultural tools and other 
objects needed for household use and clothes.  Trade was minimal in the rural areas and exchange of 
crops for services was standard practice.  The currency used, the Maria Theresa dollar, was heavy and 
inconvenient, but used for the few cash transactions, mostly in the towns and weekly markets.  The 
service-provider lower status groups resided in villages or small towns near the weekly markets and 
travelled around as needed.   
 
Sada and quda performed their judicial tasks, as called for, at home or at the weekly markets and 
people brought their problems and conflicts to them.21  Overall there was little interaction with the 
towns, none of which could qualify as cities; they were the location for the rulers and for the 
centralised administrative activities, as well as trade.  Even the coastal ports had limited trade, though 
the southern coast was different and its ports were the starting point for outmigration to south and 
south-east Asia for people from Hadramaut and Shabwa from the 18th century onwards, while 
mountain people from further west headed to East Africa through Aden and Mokha.  Most people 
usually left as a result of economic need and drought.  However, until the 20th century there was little 
outmigration from the northern and central Highlands. 
  
In brief the economy was agricultural with tribal households operating on a more or less self-
sufficient, not to say subsistence, base, paying for services in staple grains from the higher and lower 
status groups to whom they also provided protection.  In some areas, tribal groups formed long-term 
associations which created the larger confederations (Hashed, Bakeel, Madhaj, Awlaqi) though 
groups within them could shift alliances.  The majority remained small with only a few thousand 
members.  International or even internal trade were insignificant, with a few exceptions, Aden being 
the main one from the late 19th century onwards: it has strong urban characteristics, based on the port 
and the needs of the comparatively large administrative sector, whose positions were mostly filled by 
Indians and Somalis, due to the fact that Aden was administered from Bombay till well into the 20th 
century.  Coastal ports also had a major role early on in the export of coffee and later the import or 
rice and other basic commodities, such as tea and sugar. 
 
With Ottoman occupation in the north, and later attempts at centralisation of taxation under the 
Imamate after 1918 on the one hand, and British rule in the south also in the 20th century, the situation 
started to change.  I will survey these changes before moving on to the post-revolutionary period.  The 
presence of urban-based dominant structures had only a limited impact on rural life, but it was at the 
root of what came later.  Alongside taxation in the north and support for compliant tribal leaders in the 
protectorates came some mechanisation, particularly of irrigation, an expanded role for trade and 
imported goods, while emigration expanded due to first the discovery of its potential and second the 
need for cash to acquire the goods arriving through the ports. 
 
CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1960s 
 
The upheavals of the 1960s were not only political: that decade can be summarised as one of struggle 
to establish the new republican regime in the north (the Yemen Arab Republic), and of anti-colonial 
struggle in the south culminating in the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
taking over from Aden and the Protectorates.  Major political, social and economic transformations 
were initiated at that time, but they really only took off under the new regimes during the following 
two decades and after unification into the Republic of Yemen in 1990.  Given the very different 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Arabia. In: Dostal, W., ed., On social evolution. Vienna: Vienna Contributions to Ethnology and Anthropology, 
pp.232-233. 
21  See: Weir, S. (2007), op. cit. chapters 6 and 7. 
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regimes and the consequences of their different development today, I will first outline the socio-
economic formations which developed in this period separately for each state.22 
 
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) 
 
Life for citizens of the YAR changed dramatically in the 1970s when the previous agricultural 
economy was undermined by mass migration to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states after the 1973 oil 
price rises and the construction boom that then flourished in those countries.  This was particularly 
pronounced in the central and northern highlands which had previously seen little migration, while 
men from the southern uplands had already been migrating in large numbers via Aden for a few 
decades. 
 
In 1975, 89% of the resident population was rural23 and 74% of the total population worked in 
agriculture,24 and only 5% in construction.  Hundreds of thousands of mostly young Yemeni men 
migrated to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to work for cash in unskilled jobs, returning home for 
short periods to spend time with their families and distribute cash and goods to a broad range of 
relatives.  This simultaneously demonstrated their success, improving their status within the 
community, and transformed the economy away from self-sufficiency through the industrial goods 
they brought back.  It was also a first step in undermining the authority structure within the household 
and village.  Previously the household head had controlled all income and the distribution of tasks; 
now young men were providing the cash which was used initially to purchase luxury goods and major 
investments and, gradually, as home produced crops became insufficient, basic necessities.  As their 
contribution was the major source of finance, they also started demanding the right to take part in 
deciding community level investments through the Local Development Associations.25  In the 
relatively well watered terraced highlands which had depended on rain fed cultivation of subsistence 
crops (sorghum, maize, wheat)  many terraces were allowed to deteriorate: the strongest men were 
away and they sent home far more cash than could be earned from the fields, so there was no 
perceived need to maintain the terraces. 
 
A commercial economy emerged, with weekly markets becoming permanent; the production of local 
handicrafts declined, partly due to their high cost, and was replaced by imports of cheap and 
fashionable industrial goods.  As described by Tutwiler, this gradually changed the status of traders.  
As its financial returns improved, trade ceased to be considered shameful or demeaning: tribesmen, 
sada and quda engaged in it.  This contributed to shifting status rankings from occupation to wealth, 
from ascribed to acquired. Tutwiler noted in 1987 “[there is a] major cultural redefinition of an entire 
occupational category as more and more tribesmen seek to enter petty commerce.  Since the 
revolution tribesmen moving from agriculture to commerce have not suffered a loss of social prestige 
or political status.”26  By the 1980s thanks to remittances the regime had “replaced a national 
dependence on grain cultivation and a self-contained system of stratified redistribution of surpluses in 
kind with an open door policy that avowedly sought integration with the global capitalist 
economy…”27  The combination of cheap imports, the rise of a commercial bourgeoisie and the 
appropriation of land by few large landlords and officials resulted in the emergence of a class 
structure and exacerbated socio-economic differentiation leading to comparable political changes in 
the power structure.  Tutwiler’s analysis of Mahweet in the northern highlands is largely valid for 
many parts of the YAR in the early to mid-1980s when he did his fieldwork.   
                                                     
22  For more background on the country, see: Lackner, H., ed. (2014). Why Yemen matters. London: Saqi; 
Brehony, N. and al Sarhan, S., eds. (2015). Rebuilding Yemen: political, economic and social challenges. 
Berlin: Gerlach. 
23  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Statistical Yearbook 1986. San‘a, p.49 
24  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Op.cit p.59. 
25  See: Carapico, S. and Tutwiler, R. (1981). Yemeni agriculture and economic change: case studies of two 
highland regions. San‘a: American Institute for Yemeni Studies. 
26  Tutwiler, R. (1987), op. cit. p.407. 
27  Tutwiler, R. (1987), op. cit. p.556. 
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nomadic pastoralism, complementing the limited resource of the remote pasturelands by grazing their 
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started to change.  I will survey these changes before moving on to the post-revolutionary period.  The 
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Arabia. In: Dostal, W., ed., On social evolution. Vienna: Vienna Contributions to Ethnology and Anthropology, 
pp.232-233. 
21  See: Weir, S. (2007), op. cit. chapters 6 and 7. 
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regimes and the consequences of their different development today, I will first outline the socio-
economic formations which developed in this period separately for each state.22 
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sada and quda engaged in it.  This contributed to shifting status rankings from occupation to wealth, 
from ascribed to acquired. Tutwiler noted in 1987 “[there is a] major cultural redefinition of an entire 
occupational category as more and more tribesmen seek to enter petty commerce.  Since the 
revolution tribesmen moving from agriculture to commerce have not suffered a loss of social prestige 
or political status.”26  By the 1980s thanks to remittances the regime had “replaced a national 
dependence on grain cultivation and a self-contained system of stratified redistribution of surpluses in 
kind with an open door policy that avowedly sought integration with the global capitalist 
economy…”27  The combination of cheap imports, the rise of a commercial bourgeoisie and the 
appropriation of land by few large landlords and officials resulted in the emergence of a class 
structure and exacerbated socio-economic differentiation leading to comparable political changes in 
the power structure.  Tutwiler’s analysis of Mahweet in the northern highlands is largely valid for 
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22  For more background on the country, see: Lackner, H., ed. (2014). Why Yemen matters. London: Saqi; 
Brehony, N. and al Sarhan, S., eds. (2015). Rebuilding Yemen: political, economic and social challenges. 
Berlin: Gerlach. 
23  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Statistical Yearbook 1986. San‘a, p.49 
24  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Op.cit p.59. 
25  See: Carapico, S. and Tutwiler, R. (1981). Yemeni agriculture and economic change: case studies of two 
highland regions. San‘a: American Institute for Yemeni Studies. 
26  Tutwiler, R. (1987), op. cit. p.407. 
27  Tutwiler, R. (1987), op. cit. p.556. 
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My experience in al Baidha governorate at that time confirms most of Tutwiler’s analysis.  In 
particular the reliance of  ‘ordinary’ rural households on their migrant males for cash which, once 
daily needs were covered, was invested in buying a 4-wheel drive vehicle, building a new house, and 
then in income-generating investments such as drilling wells to irrigate their fields and change their 
cropping patterns, a shop, construction equipment or a small generator.  At that time, if I met a young 
or middle-aged man when visiting a rural household, conversation was based on when they had come 
back from Saudi, when they were returning, how they were investing their earnings, what they 
thought of Saudi Arabia, and the like.  The likelihood of them not being on a visit from their locale of 
migration was negligible.  At the time with a population of  9.274 million, 1.168 million or 13% were 
international migrants28, most of them in Saudi Arabia. 
  
This commercially based rural economy was gradually modified by the emerging power of the 
military and security forces as Saleh (who came to power in 1978) expanded his control throughout 
the country through three basic mechanisms: 
 
- subsidising selected tribal leaders once he had access to oil income after 1986;  
- ensuring the presence everywhere of security agents, from the many security and military 
institutions he established;  
- enrolling all local leaders (tribal and others) into the General People’s Congress, a quasi-party 
which he created in 1982. 
 
This process enabled those in political favour to accumulate wealth through appropriation, and created 
a real division within communities between the emerging kleptocrats (albeit on a small scale) and the 
rest of the population who felt oppressed.  This also distorted the relations between citizens and tribal 
leaders. 
 
In brief, by the time of unification in 1990, social structures had been significantly redesigned thanks 
to the emergence of new criteria for the definition of status, shifting from ascription based on 
occupation (artisan/trader, tribes, sada), to wealth (from migration, trade, concentration of land and 
corruption) and power, (based on the support for the Saleh regime necessary to receive cash handouts 
and increasing power of the security/military apparatus).  The lowest social status group of 
muhamasheen or akhdam remained as it was and it became clear that discrimination against it was 
based on ‘racial’ and ethnic prejudice29 rather than any other features. 
 
The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) 
 
Social and economic changes in the PDRY during the 1970s and 1980s were somewhat different.  
Although downplayed by the regime, migration played almost as significant a role in the life of most 
rural households.  In 1988, out of a total of 2.345 million people, 238,150 or 10.15% were abroad.30  
Its importance was very considerable despite the regime’s ambiguous attitude to migration as, while it 
provided foreign exchange and improved rural living standards it also reduced the labour force 
available within the country and was deplored as a ‘brain drain.’  While the majority of migrants 
were, as in the YAR, tribesmen from mountain villages with small agricultural holdings, they also 
included political exiles from different social strata, including people from urban areas. 
 
The previously strong urban economy of Aden collapsed immediately after independence with the 
departure of the British from their military base and the closure of the Suez Canal after the 1967 
                                                     
28  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Op.cit, p.31.  This gave a lower percentage of 
out-migrants than earlier censuses, with 12.6%, whereas in 1981 the percentage was 16% and in 1975 19%, 
though some of this difference is likely to be due to different methodologies, let alone some inaccuracies. 
29  Walters, D. (1987). Op.cit. 
30  People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Central Statistical Organization. (1989). Statistical Yearbook 1988, 
Aden, p.47.  
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Arab-Israeli war.  Between them these events left the port idle, indeed it has never fully recovered.  
Despite ambiguous policies towards the private sector, during these decades Aden gradually 
developed a few industries which provided goods for the local market and reduced dependence on 
imports.  Aden also remained the most important city: as the capital, it had an important 
administrative economy and until the 1980s it had the only university in the country. 
 
Although to a lesser extent than claimed by the regime, in most areas the rural economy was 
transformed by the introduction of socialist-type cooperatives and state farms; the cooperatives did 
not everywhere live up to their intended objectives and many were simply marketing and input 
acquisition arrangements, leaving farm management largely as it had been previously.  State farms 
were established on newly reclaimed lands and on the few large farms previously owned by some of 
the wealthier rulers of the protectorates.  The main social impact of these changes was to formally 
make all farmers equal and remove the distinctions between tribal owners, sharecroppers and lower 
status cultivators.   
 
The regime’s ideological opposition to tribalism and commitment to socialism meant that deliberate 
efforts went into undermining the former social structure.  Most tribal leaders, particularly those who 
had ruled the various statelets of the federation, emigrated; discrimination based on status was made 
illegal.  Low status groups (particularly in Hadramaut with the previous fellaheen/sada relationship 
ended) were given land and thus acquired status similar to that of tribespeople; they also improved 
their status through education, achieving professional positions.  Education played a big role in 
developing a social stratum of educated employees as teachers, medical workers and in 
administration, while the security apparatus was more concerned with dissidents within the Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP) than with the rest of the population.  The Family Law improved women’s status 
and gave women economic and social opportunities they had not had previously.  The military, while 
important and mostly from tribal/mountainous areas, were involved in the factional struggles within 
the YSP, but the differences were largely personal or political, rather than based on tribal 
considerations. 
 
In summary, by the time of unification, the PDRY’s social structure was less tribal, more explicitly 
egalitarian, and its economy had socialist characteristics, with strengthened roles for the state and 
cooperative sectors.  The gap between rich and poor was minimal, partly as a result of policy and 
partly thanks to the almost complete absence of corruption.  The economy was more diversified, with 
some industries and a larger professional class; although migration played an important role, it was 
not a defining one.  By 1990 the social structure of the PDRY did not fit firmly within the western 
description of a class society, but it was heading in the direction of an east European one, with the 
emergence of a modern economy with strong professional and administrative sectors.  Changes in the 
social structure which had been initiated in the final decades of the protectorates had further 
developed during the socialist regime, even though they had taken a different direction in each of 
these two periods.  But in both cases, the direction was one in which status was strongly associated 
with current activity, rather than with ascription. 
 
The Republic of Yemen (RoY) 
 
The two decades between unification and the full-scale crisis in 2011 saw some very significant 
changes in the social structure and the economy of the country.  The main trends saw the whole of 
Yemen moving in the direction started in the YAR with the Saleh regime’s ascendency in the 
previous decade.  But to briefly refer to the current situation, it is worth noting that one of the features 
which led to today’s southern conflict is the speed with which the socio-economic and political 
character of the YAR was imposed on the citizens of the former PDRY without giving them any 
choice.   
 
The fundamental changes which have affected Yemen’s social, economic and political structures in 
this period are the following. 
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28  Yemen Arab Republic, Central Planning Organisation. (1987). Op.cit, p.31.  This gave a lower percentage of 
out-migrants than earlier censuses, with 12.6%, whereas in 1981 the percentage was 16% and in 1975 19%, 
though some of this difference is likely to be due to different methodologies, let alone some inaccuracies. 
29  Walters, D. (1987). Op.cit. 
30  People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Central Statistical Organization. (1989). Statistical Yearbook 1988, 
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- Continued decline of the agricultural base of the economy.  Rapid population growth as well 
as exacerbating social differentiation meant that on the one hand land was concentrated 
among a few wealthy landowners, particularly in the more productive and well irrigated areas 
such as the Tihama, while on the other hand in the densely populated highlands holding sizes 
shrank with each generation, as the number of people dependent on each feddan31 increased 
markedly.  As tribespeople became poorer, they sold land, thus worsening their long-term 
prospects, and the vicious downward spiral continued.  The loss of agricultural land resulting 
from close to two decades of neglect of the terraces, combined with rapid population growth, 
led to a situation where rural households were unable to achieve an acceptable living standard 
through their own fields and livestock.  This has contributed to undermining the status of 
tribes as institutions and upholders of principles of social behaviour as people looked at the 
material achievements of people connected with the rewarding security sector. 
 
- Although awareness of the country’s absolute water shortage became an economic, social and 
political issue, the regime took little action to address this fundamental problem which 
threatens the very existence of the country.  Instead, it facilitated favoured tribal leaders’ 
access to credit and support for investment in irrigation pumps, allowing them to continue 
irrigating their crops as the water table lowered, and smallholders lost all access to water as 
their shallower wells dried up.  In addition to contributing to the long-term depletion of the 
country’s water resources, this worsened the gap between rich and poor within the tribes and 
thus contributed to social stresses and disaffection within tribes.  
 
- The modern industrial sector remained under the control of a few large family enterprises, 
originally from the trader group, many of them from Taiz, Aden and Hodeida.  They built 
food processing and other enterprises, which provided employment for a few thousand 
people.  The sustainability and success of their enterprises was dependent on their willingness 
to collaborate with Saleh and his close associates: refusal to share profits with this group 
systematically led to serious problems of one kind or another. 
 
- Income from the oil-based economy almost entirely ended up in the Saleh patronage system, 
and was used in part to finance the subsidies and cash handouts Saleh used to bolster his 
authority throughout the country.  Oil was never the magic bullet which Yemenis had dreamt 
of as, at its peak, production was only about 400,000 b/d, an insignificant amount compared 
to the main peninsula and Gulf producers.  Unfortunately it was not used to finance 
productive development investments, laying the foundations for a post-oil economy.  The 
economy therefore continued to be based on trade and imports, thus further enriching the 
small group of importers allied with the Saleh regime.  The often mentioned disaffection of 
the tribes in the Mareb32 area is very much due to the fact that, although their governorate is 
one of the main oil producers, they were not given access to electricity or other services as 
they were not in favour with the Saleh clique. 
 
- There was very limited progress in many of the investments necessary for a healthy economy: 
the education system suffered from very low standards preventing the emergence of a 
knowledge-based economy.  Lack of opportunities for the graduates from secondary schools 
and universities discouraged youth.  Urbanisation created a large population of temporary and 
permanent residents increasingly frustrated at their unemployment, who witnessed daily the 
worsening gap between the impoverished majority and the ostentatious wealth of the 
minority.  Many of these were tribesmen who experienced this deterioration in their social 
                                                     
31  1 feddan  is about 1 acre or 0.42 hectare 
32  The status of tribal leaders’ role in conflict mediation in the first decade of 2000s in al Baidha, Mareb, 
Shabwa, and Jawf is discussed in al Dawsari, N. et al. (2012). Yemen community-based conflict mitigation 
programme. Partners for Democratic Change International. Available at: http://www.pdci-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/baseline-assessment-without-annexes.pdf [Accessed 18 Jun. 2016]. 
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status as acute shame, as they stood on street corners waiting for unskilled work as daily 
labourers. 
 
- The transformation of the tribal system took off in a big way, seriously undermining its earlier 
characteristics as described in most texts on the nature of tribes: there was a reduction in 
solidarity and in egalitarianism through a process of politicisation based on community 
leaders’ relationship with the Saleh regime.  The main criterion to retain or increase power 
was support for the Saleh regime.  This was essential to ensure access to financial subsidies, 
state employment opportunities mainly in the military/security sectors, and development 
projects which shaykhs needed to fulfil their ‘traditional’ obligations of hospitality and care to 
their tribespeople.  These became all the more indispensable in the face of deteriorating 
economic circumstances.33  While in the past a poor but honourable tribal leader’s decisions 
and skills were respected and ensured he remained in position and popular, in the transformed 
circumstances a leader lost support unless he could provide jobs or financial assistance, given 
the need resulting from rapid population growth and reduced opportunities.  However, tribal 
shaykhs continued to solve conflicts within their communities and this enabled them to retain 
some influence.  One way or another, tribal leaders’ independence was  reduced or even 
entirely eliminated;  a shaykh who did not cooperate with the Saleh regime was liable to find 
himself deposed or face critical difficulties for himself and his group.34  Saleh did not, and 
indeed could not, select or depose shaykhs directly.  Instead he and his agents discreetly and 
indirectly sponsored intra- and inter-tribal conflicts which would eventually lead to changes 
and the promotion of one of his supporters.  This affected not only opponents to the regime 
but also any group which did not explicitly support it. 
 
-  A decline in the importance of the traditional ascribed social statuses: the new twin markers 
of status became wealth and access to central power.  Though there were obviously 
exceptions, tribesmen and sada were no longer respected for upholding the values of honour 
and just behaviour.  As wealth and the ability to provide material benefits became the main 
criteria for high status, so traders became powerful through their ability to make gifts and 
loans and investments and, as a result tribesmen as well as sada became involved in trade 
themselves.  Trade changed its status from low to high status.35 
 
- The rise of ‘political’ parties, in particular Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the 
Islah as ‘new’ mechanisms of access to status and benefits. 
 
- The domination of a military/security elite, led by individuals close to Saleh through kin or 
agnatic relations, and composed mainly of men from his own sub-tribe as well as others based 
in neighbouring areas.  They were (and largely still are) above the law and used their 
positions first to enforce Saleh’s aims and second for private benefit, each in proportion to his 
rank.  Leaders include some of the more efficient and better known kleptocrats.36  They have 
accumulated wealth through land, industry and control or participation in the major economic 
enterprises.37 
 
- In the southern governorates, in addition to all the above features, was added the return of 
exiles, many of whom intended to take revenge on those who had supported the socialist 
                                                     
33  For most tribespeople, poverty is considered shameful, see: Weir, S. (2007), op. cit. p.42. 
34  See, among others: Peterson, J. (2008). Tribes and politics in Yemen. Arabian Peninsula Background Note, 
APBN 007, p.10. 
35  An interesting example of changed living conditions and status in San‘a and Taiz is given in: Carapico, S. 
and Myntti, C. (2016). A tale of two families: change in north Yemen, 1977-89. In: Carapico, S. ed., Arabia 
incognita: dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf, 1st ed. Charlottesville: Just World Books. 
36  The importance of this group is explained in: Hill, G. et al. (2013). Yemen, corruption, capital flight and 
global drivers of conflict. London: Chatham House. 
37  See among others: Peterson, J. (2008), op. cit. pp.10-11. 
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31  1 feddan  is about 1 acre or 0.42 hectare 
32  The status of tribal leaders’ role in conflict mediation in the first decade of 2000s in al Baidha, Mareb, 
Shabwa, and Jawf is discussed in al Dawsari, N. et al. (2012). Yemen community-based conflict mitigation 
programme. Partners for Democratic Change International. Available at: http://www.pdci-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/baseline-assessment-without-annexes.pdf [Accessed 18 Jun. 2016]. 
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regime and, as they saw it, usurped their status.  Those who had stayed (or not known any 
other regime) were not only deprived of the benefits they took for granted (free health care 
and education, access to jobs, access to land for the previous sharecroppers and tenants, a 
basic living standard) but, in addition, saw both returnees and members of the kleptocratic 
group being privileged and appropriating land and other assets which had previously been 
theirs to use, if not to own.  Inflation and the loss of jobs were additional causes of 
resentment, particularly after the 1994 civil war.  These former exiles’ contemptuous attitude 
to those who had been encouraged to consider themselves equal citizens created resentment. 
 
- At the village and household levels, the economy based on international migration38 was 
replaced by one based on internal migration whose financial benefits were far lower.  Local 
migration is short-term and far less rewarding: the men waiting to be hired on urban street 
corners are mostly rural tribesmen, not all of them young, whose families are dependent on 
the income they can bring or send back.  However, alongside the deterioration of the 
agriculturally based sources of income, and given the stresses brought by poverty, this 
dependence on casual labour increases tensions within households as the men migrating for 
shorter periods for low status work in the towns and cities both return home more frequently 
and provide less income.  A dramatic change from rapidly improving living standards in the 
1970s and 1980s to bare survival in the 1990s and 2000s accentuated tensions.  Either way, 
the main income earners remain the younger generation of men, some of whom become 
reluctant to obey their elders. 
 
By contrast with the situation in the 1970s and 80s, when Yemenis throughout the country 
experienced gradually improving living standards and were optimistic for their own and their 
children’s future, the situation was reversed after unification in 1990.  Only a few months later, 
Yemen refused to approve a United Nations Security Council resolution authorising armed 
intervention to address the crisis arising from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.  This led to the 
expulsion of over 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, simultaneously putting an 
end to the remittances they had sent and adding to the unemployed labour force.  Another 
consequence was a serious reduction of bilateral and multilateral international development 
assistance, thus jeopardising the new state’s prospects.  In the following years, living conditions for 
Yemenis continued to decline with the adoption of structural adjustment policies, misuse of oil 
revenues, and misguided development policies.  While the majority of the population suffered, a small 
group of primarily military-security families close to Saleh, as well as of a few other traders and 
business people, prospered and ostentatiously displayed their largely ill-gotten gains. 
 
The professional middle class which might have been expected to emerge through the strengthening 
of a modern capitalist economy and higher educational standards was numerically insignificant as 
inflation, corruption and rising living costs held it back.  People were compelled to remain dependent 
on tribal and other personal connections to cope with daily administrative and other problems.  Many 
who might have been expected to be part of this group, such as teachers and health workers, remained 
poor.  The majority of rural tribespeople subsisted from a combination of cultivation, livestock and 
the casual labour of their men in the towns, but overall were being gradually impoverished.  The 
period was marked by the absence of political organisations or entities proposing programmes which 
would solve people’s problems.  The notable exception was the Islamist section of the Islah party 
which gained support throughout the country.  Although urbanisation increased considerably, and 
San‘a itself became a city of about 2 million people, 70% of Yemen’s population remained rural. 
 
                                                     
38  Although by the 2000s the number of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia had again risen to about one million, this 
represents about half of what it had done twenty years earlier as a proportion of the Yemeni population.  
Moreover their working conditions were far less rewarding, so the impact did not compare.  See Thiollet, H. 
(2014). The changing dynamics of migration in Yemen. In: Lackner, H., ed., Why Yemen matters. London: Saqi, 
p.273. 
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Against an objective background of the doubling of the population and notable water shortages, both 
major contributing causes of the economic crisis, this period saw a fundamental change in the social 
structure of the country which can be summarised as follows.   
 
- The importance of tribes and tribal norms declined markedly: tribal leaders either 
consolidated their positions through their Saleh connections or lost power and their positions 
in favour of others who were aligned with the Saleh regime, either directly or through his 
representatives in each community.  Representatives at the local level could be the GPC 
office, local government administrators, or overt and covert security personnel.  Many 
shaykhs also became ‘city shaykhs’ as they needed to be in San‘a to be close to the real power 
to get the financial and other support they sought, and tribes people who needed them either 
had to wait for shaykh’s visits home or travel to San‘a themselves.   
- Real power was concentrated among Saleh and his closest cronies who had transformed the 
tribal tradition of arms-bearing and protection of their group into a modern military/security 
apparatus which acted with impunity and sold its support. 
- Status based on occupation and birth was replaced in practical terms by status based on 
wealth, regardless of how it had been acquired.  This was particularly acute given the 
worsening poverty of the vast majority of the population who were forced by circumstances 
to comply with demands for bribes and to seek the assistance of people whom they really 
despised.  This further undermined the moral fabric of the tribal social structure. 
- Finally the rise in unemployment and the changed economic circumstances within households 
and villages meant that the younger generations were increasingly frustrated and disaffected, 
being unable to achieve basic ambitions.39 
 
THE CURRENT CRISIS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EMERGING SOCIAL 
STRUCTURES 
 
The revolutionary movement which coincided with the Arab Spring in 2011 had been long expected.  
The points made above show that the gradual deterioration in material and ethical living conditions in 
the country had become an explosive mix.  There was widespread demand for fundamental change.  
Saleh was determined to continue extracting whatever wealth he could, as well as hang on to power 
and indeed pass it on to his son.  Nor was he willing to abandon kleptocracy or make any serious 
concessions to the needs of the population.  This paper cannot address in detail all issues, including 
the Huthi wars, the rise of the separatist movement or many others, I will examine two aspects of the 
crisis in which the previous decades’ transformations in the country’s social structure are particularly 
relevant: the relationship between tribes and political parties and the rise of jihadism.   
 
Tribes and political parties 
 
Yemen has a multiplicity of so-called political parties.  However, they do not play the roles which 
many of us associate with such organisations.  The largest is the General People’s Congress (GPC), 
Saleh’s party, currently split between his supporters and those of president Hadi.  It is not really a 
party in the normal sense of the word, as it has no specific political programme which would 
differentiate it from others.  It was created in 1982 on Saleh’s initiative to bring together as many 
local personalities of all kinds as he could, whether tribal leaders, sada or others, into an organisation 
whose sole purpose was to support him.  At the time of elections it publicises certain programmatic 
intentions.  It has branches and representatives throughout the country, including many individuals 
connected with the security services.  Its local agents ensure that people turn out to vote for Saleh or 
his supporters in local and parliamentary elections.  It systematically attempts to co-opt anyone who 
emerges as a local personality; most of the time successfully.  Involvement with the GPC is one of the 
means to access jobs and other advantages.  Its national presence goes beyond any regional, tribal or 
                                                     
39  For examples of this problem, see: USAID, Education Development Centre Inc. (2008). Yemen cross-
sectoral youth assessment: final report, p.33. Available at: 
http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Yemen_2008_Youth_Assessment_Report.pdf [Accessed 18 Jun. 2016]. 
Taiz, men looking for work, May 2009. (Copyright Helen Lackner).
Tribesmen meeting, Dhamar Governorate, 2006. (Copyright Helen Lackner).
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other group allegiances, and thus it could have become a base on which to build a genuine national 
democratic entity. Indeed, the late Dr Abdul Karim al Eryani tried to move it in that direction.  His 
initiative was defeated by Saleh’s determination to retain his position as an all-powerful authoritarian 
ruler.   
 
The second most important party is the Islah (officially the Congregation for Reform); it combines 
two main interest groups: Hashed tribesmen, (one of the two main tribal confederations of the far 
north), on the one hand, and Muslim Brothers on the other.  It thus brings together conservative 
Muslims upholding some tribal norms and a Muslim Brotherhood political programme.  Some of the 
leaders of the second branch, Abdul Majid al Zindani and Ali Mohsen al Ahmar in particular, can be 
said to be at the more extremist end of that spectrum, closer to jihadis than the more moderate branch.  
Ali Mohsen is one of the most controversial figures in the current crisis, and was appointed Vice 
President of the government in exile in April 2016. 
 
Islah’s popularity throughout the country resides in the fact that it is the only party which offers a 
genuinely popular programme.  Many people from under-privileged groups, including the low status 
social strata, have joined it.  As stated by Rodionov (2006) with reference to Hadramaut, ‘another way 
of getting rid of hereditary stigma is to join an Islamic organization or political party, e.g. al-Islah, 
which stresses the principle of equality of all Muslims before God and People.’40  Here Rodionov 
refers to the low status fellaheen who had lost the lands received under the socialist system of the 
PDRY through the re-privatization policies in the mid-1990s.  However, in my view there were two 
additional factors leading this group to support Islah: first was the condescending, not to say insulting, 
treatment they received from the returned sada, tribesmen and other newly privileged groups.  The 
second was the fact that they had lost faith in the ability of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) to 
protect their interests after 1994, when it was seriously weakened.  Their support for the Islah enabled 
that party to have significant representation from the southern governorates in Parliament: of the 10 
MPs from Wadi Hadramaut in the last parliament elected in 2003, two were independents, four from 
the GPC and four from Islah. 
 
The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) now sees itself as a social democratic party and is part of the 
Socialist International, alongside the British Labour Party and so many others.  This transformation 
was an important step.  However, from the point of view of the situation in Yemen, it was and still is 
seen as the party of the southerners, even though much of its current leadership and membership are 
from the former YAR.  Its failure to support southern separatism has lost it much support.  It split in 
1994 as most of its members supported unity and did not go with the breakaway secessionist group.  
The YSP, the Baathist or Nasserist parties, are the only parties which can be conventionally described 
as standard political parties.  Their lack of ‘tribal’ base and inability or unwillingness to provide 
material benefits also contribute to their weakness.  By contrast, al Haqq and the Union of Popular 
Forces are sada parties, so here membership is clearly based on inherited status loyalty. 
 
Overall political parties have not become standard institutions or mechanisms for those seeking 
political progress or change, primarily because election after election demonstrated the complete 
control over the political process of the Saleh clique, sometimes in alliance with Islah.  This remained 
the case regardless of the regime’s failure, deliberate or otherwise, to create an economy allowing the 
population to improve its living conditions.  This was achieved through the GPC’s capacity to provide 
material benefits as well as systematic manipulation of the electoral process. 
 
Given that they are the vast majority of the population, tribespeople are the main members of parties, 
while members of other social status groups are also involved.  However, membership of the GPC is 
primarily due to its usefulness in obtaining jobs or assistance.  The Islamist faction of Islah can be 
said to partly represent lower status groups, and Islah as a whole is also often in a position to provide 
certain advantages such as employment in the al Ahmar business empire.  By contrast the other parties 
                                                     
40  Rodionov, M. (2006). Social re-stratification in modern Hadramawt. Quaderni di Studi Arabi, nuova serie, 1, 
p.184. 
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can provide few practical benefits: the YSP can be seen as the party of the middle class and 
intellectuals committed to social democracy, regardless of their origins.  While the two sada parties 
are the only ones to be clearly associated with a formal ascribed social status. 
 
The following incident contributes to understanding many Yemenis’ attitudes to parties.  When the 
Huthis ransacked the home of Sadeq al Ahmar, the leader of the once-powerful Hashed tribal 
confederation, and leader of the Islah party, other tribal shaykhs considered this unacceptable: 
“Hashed as a tribe was insulted. We are tribal leaders first before we are heads of political parties.  
What we saw from Houthi supporters and their militia is scary.  They’ve insulted sheikhs like us in 
other places.”41  
 
The National Dialogue Conference was the main political element of the transition process which 
started in 2011.  Of its 565 seats, 298 were allocated to political parties.  But this gave a majority to 
what could be described as the existing political elite.  The overall failure of the NDC can in large part 
be attributed to the vested interests of many of its members, and particularly those representing the 
two major political parties, Islah (50 members), and the GPC (112 members).  This situation is also 
currently reproduced to a significant extent among the membership of the delegations to the Kuwait 
negotiations in 2016. 
 
The attraction of Jihadism 
 
Manipulation of the relationship between tribes and extremists has been a sustained theme in recent 
years.  Particularly in the media, but also in officialdom, there has been a tendency to take a simplistic 
approach based on the widespread prejudices about tribes, and to link the concept of tribalism with the 
presence of al Qaeda and other jihadi groups, mostly to reflect negatively on tribes.  Among recent 
examples is the following quotation from Yahya Saleh, nephew of ex-President Saleh, who 
commanded the Central Security Forces (CSF) until 2012.  “The coalition between extremist groups 
and tribal units made it difficult to fight the terrorists, some tribes sympathized with the terrorists.” 42  
Coming from him in particular, this needs to be taken with a large dose of salt; however, it is worth 
noting that such a statement is taken seriously by an authoritative publication such as Foreign Policy, 
which journal also fails to address critically Yahya’s role in the Saleh regime.  
 
In early 2016, media coverage systematically stated that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
was in control of Hadramaut Governorate with tribal support.  When AQAP left Mukalla, the 
governorate capital, it was asserted in an equally blanket manner that the jihadis had now been 
expelled from Hadramaut.  Such claims are misleading.  While AQAP certainly had a presence in 
coastal Hadramaut, they did not control the majority of that governorate, as the Wadi, and the 
northern and southern plateaux have remained loyal to the internationally recognised regime in exile 
since the beginning of the war.  Similarly the majority of the coast in Hadramaut and all the way to 
Aden is occupied by a series of isolated fishing settlements, so, while AQAP may have had influence 
in certain villages, it certainly did not control the whole coast; for example, the area around Ahwar in 
Abyan is one where the long-lasting historic dissidence of the Bakazem has been equated with support 
for AQAP, which is inaccurate. 
 
Moreover AQAP were not driven out of Hadramaut or indeed Abyan or Shabwa: deals were made, 
largely thanks to mediation from local tribal leaders, allowing them to leave, in most cases with their 
weapons, including heavy ones.  As for tribal support, the first point to make is that tribes are not as 
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other group allegiances, and thus it could have become a base on which to build a genuine national 
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can provide few practical benefits: the YSP can be seen as the party of the middle class and 
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significant a demographic force in Hadramaut as they are elsewhere in Yemen, particularly in the 
coastal areas.  With respect to support from the population, Hadramis in general are extremely 
attached to the tombs of their saints, and the AQAP practice of destroying them was certainly not 
welcome, nor indeed was their forbidding of any manifestation of southern separatism, another fairly 
strong tendency in coastal Hadramaut.  Their military strength was also connected with their 
cooperative relationship with local bases of the Republican Guards, i.e. supporters of the Saleh/Huthi 
alliance.  More examples could be dissected of the inaccuracy of assertions of AQAP power in 
Yemen, in particular the frequently mentioned occupation by Ansar al Shari’a (AQAP local group) of 
Ja’ar in Abyan in 2011-12.   
 
Instead I will move on to the opposing claims - where tribes are helping fight the jihadis.  There are 
numerous cases of tribes fighting the jihadis, including those in Mareb,43 reputed to be among the 
most independent tribes with least allegiance to San‘ani authorities (whoever they might be at any 
time).  In 2010, the United States hired tribesmen to hunt Al-Qaeda in Shabwa province: “Hassan 
Bannan, a leader of one of the Awalik branches in Shabwa and an opponent of the policy, told The 
Associated Press that more than 2,500 tribesmen have been divided into small groups to carry out 
daily searches.  Another tribesman, Awad al-Awlaki, said 180 of his fellow tribesmen in the Shabwa 
town of al-Saaid each received 100 automatic rifle bullets and a daily stipend of $50.”44  However, it 
is worth noting that the Awlaqi are also the tribe of Anwar al Awlaqi the US citizen AQAP 
propagandist, who was killed by a US drone strike in 2011; he was living among his tribespeople 
when he was killed. 
An example of the complexity of reality is the situation in al Baidha.  For the past year or two there 
have been numerous reports about close cooperation between tribes and AQAP.  Here it is a clear case 
of both groups opposing the Huthi-Saleh alliance, hence it is reasonable for both to fight together 
against their common enemy.  This does not mean, contrary to what is often said, that al Baidha’s 
tribes are supporters of AQAP, but simply that they currently have a common enemy: of about 15 
tribes present in the governorate only small sections of four of them are committed jihadis; these 
include some leading families who have become notorious as a result of this association. 
These few examples have shown that the relationship between tribes and jihadism is far more 
complex than usually presented, and that it is essential to look at it closely, rather than generalise 
widely.  To understand this relationship it is essential to have an accurate understanding of the basic 
characteristics of the country’s current social composition; they have been mentioned earlier in this 
paper.  With 70% of Yemen’s population tribal and roughly the same percentage rural (with a high 
level of overlap) there are about 18 million tribespeople.  It is therefore likely that a fair proportion of 
the Yemeni membership of AQAP and Daesh would be tribesmen.  There is also significant evidence 
to suggest that low status groups are attracted to these organisations due to their rejection of inherited 
status categories: that was the case of the people who remained in Ja’ar (Abyan) when it was under 
the control of Ansar al Shari’a (AQAP) in 2011-12.  Almost everyone else, and particularly all the 
tribespeople, left the town but having been given some power low status people stayed around.  
Similarly, as mentioned above, many of the low status groups in Wadi Hadramaut had shifted their 
allegiance from the YSP to Islah after unification because that party treated them as citizens: some of 
their youth may well have chosen to join more extremist forms of Islamism. 
 
As was pointed out to me frequently in the field in recent decades, another major factor has been the 
weakening authority of older male household heads and tribal leaders resulting from the changed 
socio-economic relationships within households and communities.  As the main cash income 
providers, younger men have sometimes challenged the authority of their elders in the nuclear and 
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extended families, as a form of protest, to assert their adulthood, or strengthen their own status within 
the community.  In some cases, particularly where there were influential figures encouraging it, this 
has taken the form of joining AQAP or, more recently, Daesh.  This does not mean that the families, 
let alone the communities of those involved, support the organisation.  However, tribal hospitality 
rules have sometimes forced people to host the comrades of their own ‘dissidents’, for short periods of 
time. 
 
There are also numerous cases of tribal leaders mediating between AQAP and the authorities or 
official military forces to ensure the safety of their communities by assisting the peaceful withdrawal 
of AQAP forces, as mentioned above, most recently in Zinjibar in Abyan and Azzan in Shabwa, as 
well as in coastal Hadramaut.  The fact that both sides are willing to benefit from the mediation of the 
tribes does not mean that either of them has the tribes’ support, but simply that the tribal leaders want 
to ensure the maximum safety and minimum fighting for their people.  Good local leaders, whether 
tribal or otherwise, have as prime objectives the protection and safeguarding of their communities.  
This may mean opposing the jihadis with arms, or it may mean tolerating them for one reason or 
another. 
 
The myth of AQAP-tribal collusion is one which conveniently enables outside ‘observers’ and 
‘experts’ to claim knowledge, rather than admit that situations are complex and requiring detailed 
information and analysis.  It also serves the interests of those who need jihadism as a bogeyman, to 
spread fear among ordinary people everywhere.  This is an important factor in keeping the ‘security’ 
business going and expanding.  Understanding the reality of this, and indeed other, features of 
Yemeni society, would lead to better decisions, which might avoid exacerbating the conflicts and 
popular disaffection in Yemen and beyond.  There is no doubt that accurate understanding requires 
committed and long-term knowledge of specific circumstances in each area.  Political and military 
exigencies tend to push policy makers to adopt short-term solutions that fit into their existing political 
programmes.  At the moment jihadism is a reality, but not on the scale publicised.  It is also a 
convenient enemy that can be easily demonised, making it much easier to pursue this crude and 
populist discourse rather than develop a more sophisticated and helpful approach to Yemen’s complex 
and multiple problems.  This politically fashionable approach is another example of the specificity of 
the country being suborned to facile policies which, in the case of jihadism in particular, have been 
proved to be so inappropriate and unsuccessful elsewhere over the past decade.  Over the past fifteen 
years, the international community’s prioritisation of counter terrorism, at the expense of so many 
other more urgent issues for the Yemeni people as a whole, has contributed to the deterioration of the 
overall political, economic and social conditions.  The media and the counter-terrorism think-tank 
experts have, through their simplistic analyses, facilitated bad decision-making by policy makers 
among Yemen’s main international partners. 
  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
While much of what I have said is very specific to the Yemeni context, one conclusion which is valid 
well beyond Yemen relates to the disaffection and frustration of youth.  Yemen is by no means alone 
in having hundreds of thousands of young people with varying levels of education whose future is 
bleak, with a lack of urban employment prospects, with collapsed household agricultural economies 
who are therefore pessimistic about their ability to improve their prospects through traditional 
political parties.  Faced with this, it is not surprising that some youths succumb to the attraction of 
extremist organisations which offer them empowerment, as well as simple recipes for solutions.  What 
is more surprising is that these youths still remain a very small minority. 
 
Almost ten years ago Peterson made a statement which reflects fairly well many of the points I have 
made in this paper: ‘it is wide off the mark to assert that there is a collective tribal political 
consciousness.  Instead the tribes and tribespeople constitute constituencies within broader political 
aggregations…. Tribesmen pursue political or military careers the same as other Yemenis… 
prominent shaykhs and sons of shaykhs occupy a number of GPC seats in parliament… tribes people 
constitute a… majority of Yemen’s population and so it is no surprise that a member of a particular 
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tribe should be elected to parliament in  his tribal district.  Furthermore it is not surprising that 
ambitious individuals, whether tribal or not, should ally themselves with the GPC, the most powerful 
party in Yemen and the party of the president.’45   
 
I have demonstrated that, while tribes constitute the majority of Yemen’s population, fundamental 
changes in the country’s social and economic structure in the past half century have expanded 
political allegiances beyond tribes.  Such changes have also allowed some non-tribal individuals, 
particularly among those of low status, to achieve full citizenship.  The changes in the country’s 
economic base, from being primarily agricultural to being based on trade, administration, and the 
military, have contributed to weakening the power of tribes per se.  Most fundamentally, the rise of 
what has become known as the kleptocratic-tribal-military nexus has not in fact been the rise of tribal 
power as such, but rather of a small clique around Saleh, composed primarily of his immediate 
relatives, people from his local sub-tribe and its neighbouring ones.  Not entirely facetiously, it could 
be suggested that his attempt to pass on the presidency to his son reflects his ambition to be Yemen’s 
most powerful ‘super’-shaykh (shaykh mashaykh) and to establish a dynasty on a tribal basis.  Given 
that higher ranking Hashed, particularly the sons of Shaykh Abdullah Hussain al Ahmar, are among 
his most bitter opponents today, this could also be seen as an attempt to shift leadership within the 
Hashed confederation to his own minor branch.  In this context, Saleh’s current alliance with the 
Huthis takes on yet another meaning. 
 
Many observers see the current war as nothing but a struggle between members of the military-
political-economic elite and, to some extent, my argument in the preceding paragraph endorses such a 
view.  This is certainly a major, possibly the main, reason holding back progress in the Kuwait peace 
negotiations in mid-2016.  However, a solution which only addresses this intra-elite power struggle 
will not be viable.  It will leave Yemen with its many major problems intact: these include an 
unsustainable governance, absolute water shortage, insufficient natural resources, low educational 
standards.  Such a short-term solution would also mean that the suffering, starvation, destruction and 
death which 25 million Yemenis have had to face daily since early 2015 will have been in vain, an 
outcome sad beyond words.  Therefore, I can only hope that those engaged in the negotiations, with 
the help and advice available to them, will at long last cease to focus on their personal interests and 
give priority to the needs of the Yemeni people, already the poorest in the Arab world before all this 
began. 
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I have demonstrated that, while tribes constitute the majority of Yemen’s population, fundamental 
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Many observers see the current war as nothing but a struggle between members of the military-
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view.  This is certainly a major, possibly the main, reason holding back progress in the Kuwait peace 
negotiations in mid-2016.  However, a solution which only addresses this intra-elite power struggle 
will not be viable.  It will leave Yemen with its many major problems intact: these include an 
unsustainable governance, absolute water shortage, insufficient natural resources, low educational 
standards.  Such a short-term solution would also mean that the suffering, starvation, destruction and 
death which 25 million Yemenis have had to face daily since early 2015 will have been in vain, an 
outcome sad beyond words.  Therefore, I can only hope that those engaged in the negotiations, with 
the help and advice available to them, will at long last cease to focus on their personal interests and 
give priority to the needs of the Yemeni people, already the poorest in the Arab world before all this 
began. 
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